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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics (“Stein 
Center”) is based at Fordham University School of Law 
and sponsors programs, develops publications, supports 
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and ethics, 
and encourages professional and public institutions to 
integrate moral perspectives into their work. Over the 
past decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham 
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of the 
administration of criminal justice, including the ethical 
and historical dimensions of the death penalty and 
execution methods. The Stein Center has submitted 
amicus briefs in three prior cases in which the Court has 
been asked to examine methods of execution: Bryan v. 
Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 43 
(2008) (citing Stein Center brief); and Glossip v. Gross, 
576 U.S. 863 (2015). 
Implementation of lethal injection as an execution 
method implicates ethical questions important to the 
Stein Center. The evolution of execution methods in the 
United States generally suggests a public consensus 
opposed to the infliction of severe pain and suffering in 
the course of executing individuals sentenced to death. 
At the same time, it is doubtful whether in practice 
1
Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to the filing of 
this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored 
this brief “in whole or in part,” and no counsel or party made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its 
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its 
preparation or submission. 
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execution methods achieve that goal. There are serious 
concerns whether legislatures, courts, and prison 
officials have responded to the risks associated with the 
implementation of lethal injection in an ethical manner. 
INTRODUCTION AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since this Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
35 (2008), the composition of lethal injection protocols 
implemented by States has been defined by rapid 
changes, experimentation with new drugs and drug 
combinations, and reversion to previously abandoned 
protocols. With rare exception, such changes have been 
implemented not by State legislatures, but by prison 
officials charged with carrying out lethal injection 
executions. Against this backdrop, this brief urges the 
Court to grant Petitioner’s request for certiorari to 
challenge Ohio’s lethal injection protocol for two main 
reasons: 
(1) Judicial review of challenges to lethal injection 
protocols is necessary in light of the historical 
development of execution methods and such protocols. 
Historically, States have moved toward new methods in 
an effort to execute inmates in a humane manner free 
from unnecessary pain. These changes came about as 
society became more aware of the risks associated with 
a certain execution method. However, when States 
adopted lethal injection as an execution method, the 
great majority of States left statutes purposefully vague 
as to the lethal injection procedure. Thus, States largely 
left the composition of their lethal injection protocols in 
the hands of unelected prison officials who are generally 
3 
not subject to public scrutiny or oversight. But prison 
officials—including those in Ohio—have continued to 
adopt protocols lacking a sufficient scientific or medical 
basis. The responsibility for ensuring that executions 
and related protocols do not risk unnecessary cruelty or 
lingering death, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 
thus lies with the courts. 
(2) By allowing Ohio to categorically reject 
Petitioner’s proposed alternative drug protocol on the 
basis that no other State has used it in an execution, the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision effectively forecloses judicial 
review of execution methods and is contrary to States’ 
historical experimentation with execution methods. 
Careful judicial scrutiny of evolving execution methods 
is critical to aiding the search for more humane methods 
and ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment. 
Not only does the Sixth Circuit’s decision eviscerate this 
scrutiny, but States’ frequent historical experimentation 
with execution methods also belies any State’s claimed 
reticence to implement a protocol proposed by an 
inmate. Thus, States should not be permitted to 
categorically reject an inmate’s proposed alternative 
execution method. Ohio’s rejection of Petitioner’s 
proposed drug protocol—a one-drug protocol using 
secobarbital—is particularly grievous because 
secobarbital is used frequently in physician-assisted 
suicides in the United States, and Ohio has historically 
been the State most willing to try new lethal injection 
protocols.   
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF METHOD-OF-
EXECUTION CHALLENGES IS ESSENTIAL 
TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC AND TO 
ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT STANDARDS. 
Since the founding of the United States, the 
evolution of execution methods has often been driven by 
the public’s increasing awareness of the risks associated 
with a particular method. This awareness placed 
pressure on State legislatures to implement a new 
execution method. Since the adoption of lethal injection, 
however, the great majority of State legislatures have 
delegated the composition of the specific lethal injection 
protocols to unelected prison officials generally not 
subject to public scrutiny and oversight. Yet prison 
officials have continued to adopt protocols lacking a 
sufficient scientific or medical basis. This dangerous 
dynamic has enhanced the importance of judicial review 
of lethal injection protocols to ensure that executions do 
not risk unnecessary cruelty or lingering death. Even 
when a drug protocol like the one at issue in this case has 
previously been reviewed, the development of new 
evidence showing risks of severe pain and needless 
suffering requires courts to be vigilant in ensuring that 
the administration of lethal injection comports with the 
Eighth Amendment.  
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A. Historically, Public Awareness Spurred By 
The Unnecessary Risk Of Pain And Suffering 
Of A Prior Execution Method Drove State 
Legislatures To Adopt A New Method. 
As is well documented, the federal government and 
every State that has the death penalty employ lethal 
injection as the method of execution. Prior to lethal 
injection, States switched methods when pre-existing 
methods were shown in practice to embody a high risk 
of painful or lingering death. In large part, the 
coordinated move from one execution method to another 
took place by legislative dictate rather than judicial 
decree. See generally Deborah W. Denno, When 
Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox 
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection 
and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63 (2002). 
With the exception of a few States that permitted use of 
the firing squad, the general historical trend in the 
United States led to the transition from hanging to 
electrocution, which gave way briefly to reliance on the 
gas chamber, before settling on lethal injection. 
Hanging. Hanging was the predominant execution 
method in the United States in the 19th century. By 
1853, hanging had become “the nearly universal form of 
execution in the United States and 48 States once 
imposed death by this method.” Campbell v. Wood, 511 
U.S. 1119, 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted). After the public witnessed gruesomely 
botched hangings that involved decapitations and slow 
strangulations, legislatures searched for a more humane 
execution method. Stuart Banner, THE DEATH 
6 
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 172–75 (2003); In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (describing the quest 
to determine “whether the science of the present day” 
could find a “less barbarous manner” of execution than 
hanging) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
Barr v. Lee, No. 20A8, 2020 WL 3964985, at *1 (U.S. July 
14, 2020) (noting that States seek to “develop[] new 
methods, such as lethal injection, thought to be less 
painful and more humane than traditional methods, like 
hanging”). 
Today, no State uses hanging as an execution 
method—a sharp contrast to the method’s dominance 
historically. See Deborah W. Denno, THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF 
PUNISHMENT (Meghan J. Ryan et al. eds., 2020) 
[hereinafter Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT]. The last 
hanging in the United States took place in 1996,2 and 
only three hangings have occurred between 1965 and 
1996.3 See id. at 231.
Electrocution. By 1915, twelve States had switched 
from hanging to electrocution, in reliance upon the 
“belief that electrocution is less painful and more 
humane than hanging.” Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 
U.S. 180, 185 (1915). Throughout the early part of the 
20th century, the vast majority of States turned to the 
2
Hanging, DEATH PENALTY CURRICULUM, https://deathpenalty
curriculum.org/student/c/about/methods/hanging.htm. 
3
Against this background, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of hanging, 
as though it were a viable option to which execution methods can be 
compared, is invalid and uninformed.  See Pet’r’s Br. 14–16. 
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electric chair as the preferred execution method. See 
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl. 2. 
Over the years, accounts of gruesomely botched 
electrocutions were widely reported. See Deborah W. 
Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions 
Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319, app. 2.A at 412 
(1997) (describing examples of botched executions). 
Following a particularly gruesome electrocution in 
Florida, this Court agreed to examine the 
constitutionality of electrocution. See Bryan, 528 U.S. 
960. But the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently 
granted after the Florida legislature altered its 
execution method to permit an inmate to choose 
between electrocution and lethal injection. See Bryan v. 
Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.105. By 
that time, public awareness of the risk that 
electrocutions would cause unnecessary pain and 
lingering death had reached a high point.4
Ohio adopted lethal injection as an alternative to 
electrocution in 1993. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 89; see 
id. tbl. 3. In 2001, when an inmate chose electrocution for 
his execution method, Ohio’s prison officials asked the 
Ohio legislature to abolish the use of electrocution 
because they were concerned that “the 104-year-old 
electric chair” would malfunction. Id. That same year, 
4
See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How 
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
49, 62–63 (2007) (describing the 1999 botched execution of Allen Lee 
Davis, who suffered deep burns and bleeding, color photographs of 
which were viewed by millions of people on the Florida Supreme 
Court’s website); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 78–79. 
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Ohio officially abandoned electrocution in favor of lethal 
injection as the State’s sole execution method. Id.
By 2009, electrocution remained an option in only six 
States. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 227. Two state 
courts had even ruled electrocution unconstitutional 
under state constitutions. See Dawson v. State, 554 
S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001) (“whether a particular 
punishment is cruel and unusual is not a static concept, 
but instead changes in recognition of the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008) (noting 
legislatures “have recognized that early assumptions 
about an instantaneous and painless death were simply 
incorrect and that there are more humane methods of 
carrying out the death penalty.”).
From 2009 to 2019, “seven inmates selected 
electrocution over lethal injection.” Denno, EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT at 228. At least three inmates selected 
electrocution out of concern about the pain associated 
with lethal injection. Id. at 228–29.
Lethal Gas. Early problems with electrocution—
together with the continued brutality of hangings—
caused some States to experiment with the gas chamber 
as an alternative to hanging. Nevada was the first State 
to authorize lethal gas in 1921. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 
at 83. Nevada initially sought to rely on lethal gas 
because it was the method used in the relatively peaceful 
killings of animals. See State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 681 
(Nev. 1923). At the time, Nevada’s deputy attorney 
general persuaded two state legislators that the method 
9 
would be more humane than hanging or the firing squad. 
Banner, supra, at 196. 
By 1955, ten additional States had adopted lethal gas. 
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 83. But, again, prison officials 
were tasked with figuring out the details of exactly how 
to carry out the method on human beings. Banner, 
supra, at 197. Over time, it became clear that inmates 
did not die peacefully by breathing in lethal gas while 
sleeping: death lingered and inmates often urinated on 
themselves, moaned, twitched, and painfully convulsed 
for minutes before finally dying. See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas, 
710 F.2d 1048, 1058–59 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Denno, 82 
IOWA L. REV. at app. 2.B. at 425. In addition, the gas 
chamber carried with it lasting association with the 
abhorrent mass killings in Nazi Germany. The gas 
chamber thus fell out of favor.   
Today, three States provide nitrogen hypoxia as an 
alternative to lethal injection or as a substitute if lethal 
injection is deemed unconstitutional or otherwise 
unavailable.5  Yet, none of these States has ever even 
attempted to use nitrogen hypoxia as an execution 
information about how such a method would be 
implemented. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 231. 
5
The three states are Alabama (in 2018), which provides nitrogen 
hypoxia as an alternative to lethal injection, and Mississippi (in 
2017) and Oklahoma (in 2015), which provide the gas as a substitute 
if lethal injection is deemed unconstitutional or otherwise 
unavailable. Denno, EIGHTH AMENDMENT at 231. 
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B. State Legislatures Delegated Implementation 
Of Lethal Injection Methods To Prison 
Officials, Insulating That Process From Public 
Scrutiny Even As It Has Appeared To Cause 
Needless Pain. 
1. The Development Of Lethal Injection 
Protocols And Widespread Adoption Of The 
Three-Drug Protocol Lacked Any Reasoned 
Consideration. 
Public scrutiny of execution methods intensified in 
the 1970s after this Court affirmed the constitutionality 
of the death penalty. States turned to lethal injection, 
with Oklahoma leading the way. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. at 70, 73–75. Beginning immediately after 
Oklahoma adopted lethal injection, other States 
switched to the method, before it had been used in an 
execution. Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment). Texas adopted lethal injection the very 
next day. Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 78. By 1982, 
when Texas conducted the first lethal injection 
execution, six States had enacted lethal injection 
statutes. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos 
Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1341 cht. 1 (2014). 
Another fifteen States adopted lethal injection from 
1983 to 1988, and twelve more States switched to lethal 
injection from 1994 to 2002. Id. 
Like Oklahoma, other States left their lethal 
injection statutes intentionally vague. See Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at 68–69; Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 
93. For example, Ohio’s lethal injection statute provides 
that death sentences are to be carried out by “a lethal 
11 
injection of a drug or combination of drugs of sufficient 
dosage to quickly and painlessly cause death.” Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2949.22. This delegation left the 
responsibility for developing execution protocols to 
corrections officials who had no specialized expertise.6
Prison officials thus had “unfettered discretion to 
determine all protocol and procedures, most notably the 
chemicals to be used, for a State execution.” Hobbs v. 
Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ark. 2012) (discussing 
Arkansas statute). 
Ultimately, the federal government and almost 
every State that adopted lethal injection as an execution 
method, including Ohio, adopted the original three-drug 
protocol that Oklahoma had initially developed—sodium 
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium 
chloride. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 868–69, 873  (noting at least 
30 States of the 36 States that use lethal injection 
employed the original three-drug protocol); Cooey v. 
Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 215 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting Ohio 
adopted the three-drug protocol). But, as this Court 
recognized, “it is undisputed that the States using lethal 
injection adopted the protocol first developed by 
Oklahoma without significant independent review of the 
procedure.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 43 n.1; see also Beardslee 
6 In 1978, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a challenge 
to a Texas lethal injection statute, concluding that the Director of 
the Department of Corrections’s authority to choose the lethal 
substance and procedure “d[id] not constitute an improper 
delegation of the [S]tate’s legislative power.” Denno, 82 IOWA L.
REV. at 375 n.328 (citing Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1978)). 
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v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1074 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(noting California’s protocol was “informally” based on 
Texas’s protocol, and “the precise protocol was never 
subjected to the rigors of scientific analysis.”). 
States copied the three-drug protocol despite the 
concerns that arose about it almost immediately. Soon 
after Oklahoma adopted the method, Oklahoma’s 
medical examiner, A. Jay Chapman, who assisted with 
devising the protocol, “said that if the death-dealing 
drug is not administered properly, the convict may not 
die and could be subjected to severe muscle pain.” Jim 
Killackey, Execution Drug Like Anesthesia, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, May 12, 1977, at 1. When Texas became 
the first State to employ the method in 1982, the Texas 
warden mistakenly mixed all three drugs into a single 
syringe, causing the mixture to turn into “white sludge.” 
Stephen Trombley, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE 
AMERICA’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74–75 
(1992). 
2. State Prison Officials Continue To Rely Upon 
Insufficient Scientific And Medical Study In 
Modifying Lethal Injection Protocols. 
Since this Court’s decision in Baze, the landscape of 
lethal injection protocols has changed dramatically.
Despite the Court’s approval of Kentucky’s three-drug 
protocol of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, 
and potassium chloride, States have subsequently 
experimented with various new drug protocols. Such 
changes resulted from either court intervention or 
practical considerations as opposed to medical or 
13 
scientific study. Indeed, these rapid changes have 
continued to accelerate.  
In the years after Baze, all States began modifying 
the precise drugs used in lethal injection protocols due 
to pragmatic considerations. Because of drug shortages, 
prison officials were forced to make substitutions for the 
first drug from the original three-drug sequence, sodium 
thiopental, in both one-drug and three-drug protocols. 
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1360–65, cht. 3; see Glossip, 576 
U.S. at 868–71. As a result, corrections officials sought 
out both alternative sources for sodium thiopental and 
substitutes for the drug, including pentobarbital, which 
itself became the subject of shortages. 
Many States have turned to midazolam as a 
substitute for sodium thiopental and pentobarbital. See 
Glossip, 576 U.S. at 871. Ohio first adopted midazolam as 
part of its multi-drug protocol in 2016. In re Ohio 
Execution Protocol, 860 F.3d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 2017). 
Today, ten States list midazolam as part of their lethal 
injection protocol, two of which use the drug as part of a 
two-drug protocol, while the other eight employ it as 
part of a three-drug protocol. Denno, EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT at 221–22, cht. 4. Although Glossip found 
the use of midazolam was not unconstitutional, it did so 
because the district court’s factual finding on the level of 
suffering caused by midazolam was not clearly 
erroneous based on the specific factual evidence and 
circumstances presented there. See 576 U.S. at 881, 883–
84, 890–93.   
Since Glossip, the evidence against midazolam’s 
constitutionality has become stronger. The consensus in 
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the scientific and medical communities regarding 
midazolam’s glaring deficiencies as a lethal agent has 
only solidified. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 
4:17-CV-00179, 2020 WL 2841589, at *5–7 (E.D. Ark. 
May 31, 2020) (describing the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists’ rejection of midazolam as an 
anesthetic, and the FDA’s recognition that midazolam 
can cause “airway obstruction, apnea, and 
cardiopulmonary arrest”). Indeed, the evidence relied on 
by the District Court here showed midazolam lacks the 
necessary analgesic effects to dull what would otherwise 
be excruciating pain caused by the second and third 
drugs in the typical three-drug protocol (the paralytic 
and the euthanizing agent). In re Ohio Execution 
Protocol Litig., No. 2:11-CV-1016, 2019 WL 244488, at 
*21 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2019) (“Dr. Exline also opined 
that midazolam does not have analgesic effects and may 
potentially increase pain perception.”), aff’d, 946 F.3d 
287 (6th Cir. 2019). Experts testifying before the 
District Court further explained that midazolam itself 
can cause excruciating pain, especially when 
administered at the levels commonly used in executions. 
Id. at *15–16. Such high doses of midazolam have been 
associated with pulmonary edemas, wherein recipients’ 
lungs are flooded by their own bodily fluids, causing 
suffocation. Id. at *15.  
Moreover, since 2014, the number of States with 
botched executions attributed to midazolam have risen 
steadily. In 2014, Ohio executed Dennis McGuire using a 
two-drug protocol that consisted of midazolam and the 
painkiller hydromorphone. Corinna Barrett Lain, The 
Politics of Botched Executions, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 825, 
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828 (2015). Witnesses to the execution watched with 
horror as McGuire “gasped, choked, and repeatedly 
clenched his fists” after the drugs were administered. Id.
at 829; see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 235 
F. Supp. 3d 892, 905 (S.D. Ohio), vacated, 860 F.3d 881 
(6th Cir. 2017). While the typical execution should last 
no longer than ten minutes, McGuire’s stretched for 
almost thirty. Barrett Lain, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. at 828–
30. The 2018 execution of Robert Van Hook 
demonstrated many of the problems observers 
witnessed in McGuire’s execution. In re Ohio Execution 
Protocol Litig., 2019 WL 244488 at *13. A reporter 
covering Van Hook’s execution described his “labored” 
breathing, “wheezing,” and “flushed” face after his 
injection with midazolam. Id.
Alabama’s experience with midazolam was hardly 
any different. According to those who witnessed the 
2016 execution of Ronald Smith, after receiving a 500 mg 
dose of midazolam, Smith began “coughing, heaving, 
flailing, or attempting to flail arms, clenching and 
unclenching [his] fists.” See In re Ohio Execution 
Protocol Litig., 235 F. Supp. 3d at 906. Just as with 
McGuire, Smith reportedly lingered near death for over 
thirty minutes before finally passing—far longer than 
the ten minutes expected for a problem-free execution. 
Kent Faulk, Alabama Death Row Inmate Ronald Bert 
Smith Heaved, Coughed for 13 Minutes During 
Execution, BIRMINGHAM REAL-TIME NEWS (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2016/12/ala
bama_death_row_inmate_is_se.html.  
In fact, evidence of botched executions involving 
midazolam exists in numerous States, including 
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Oklahoma, Florida, Arizona, Tennessee, and Virginia. 
See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 725 (10th Cir.) 
(describing Clayton Lockett’s botched execution in 
Oklahoma, which lasted for forty-three minutes), aff’d, 
576 U.S. 863 (2015); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 
235 F. Supp. 3d at 906 (describing Paul Howell opening 
his eyes during the consciousness check after receiving 
midazolam in Florida); id. (describing Joseph Wood 
“gasp[ing] and try[ing] to breathe until his death almost 
two hours after the process began” in Arizona); id at 907 
(describing Rick Gray’s “labored breathing, gasping, 
snoring, and other audible and visible activity” during 
his execution in Virginia); West v. Parker, No. 3:19-CV-
00006, 2019 WL 2341406, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2019) 
(noting that Billy Ray Irick “gasped for air, he hacked 
and coughed, his face turned deep purple and he moved 
his head” after receiving midazolam for his execution in 
Tennessee), aff’d, 783 F.3d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 25 (2019).  
In light of midazolam’s well-documented failures, 
multiple States have recently sought alternatives. For 
instance, in 2017, Florida officially replaced midazolam 
with etomidate as the first drug in its protocol, becoming 
the first State to adopt that chemical for its executions. 
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 235 F. Supp. 3d at 
906. Arizona similarly agreed to discontinue its use of 
midazolam in 2016 as part of a larger settlement 
agreement regarding its execution practices. Id. And in 
2018, a Nevada judge halted the execution of Scott 
Dozier over concerns about the drug. Robbie Gonzalez, 
Why Nevada’s Execution Drug Cocktail Is So 
Controversial, WIRED (July 11, 2017), 
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https://www.wired.com/story/the-untested-drugs-at-
the-heart-of-nevadas-execution-controversy/. Other 
States that have recently amended their lethal injection 
protocols have also adopted non-midazolam chemicals.7
Notably, the federal government chose not to employ 
midazolam in resuming executions after a nearly two 
decade hiatus. Lee, 2020 WL 3964985, at *1.  
Since the beginning of 2019 alone, prison officials 
have employed three different drug combinations in 
lethal injection executions8—a sharp contrast to States’ 
use of the same three-drug protocol for over thirty years 
until 2010. 
7
See Ward v. Carter, 90 N.E.3d 660, 661 (Ind.) (upholding the state’s 
switch to brevital, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride 
for its three-drug protocol), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 240 (2018); Mitch 
Smith, Fentanyl Used to Execute Nebraska Inmate, in a First for 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/carey-dean-moore-
nebraska-execution-fentanyl.html (describing Nebraska’s recent 
switch to a four-drug protocol using diazepam, fentanyl citrate, 
cisatracurium besylate, and potassium chloride). 
8
 The three drug combinations were: (1) a three-drug protocol 
using midazolam; (2) a one-drug protocol using pentobarbital; and 
(3) a three-drug protocol using etomidate. See Execution List 
2019, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/2019 (last updated Dec. 11, 
2019) (last visited Aug. 31, 2020); Execution List 2020, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/2020 (last updated Aug. 28, 
2020) (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
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C. Judicial Scrutiny Of Prison Officials’ 
Administration Of Lethal Injection Is 
Necessary To Ensure Compliance With The 
Eighth Amendment. 
As the history demonstrates, States adopted lethal 
injection generally and numerous drug protocols 
specifically without serious study or independent 
analysis. States uniformly delegated to prison officials 
the details of lethal injections. Historical practice and 
contemporary evidence indicate that prison officials 
likely lack the necessary expertise to develop lethal 
injection protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or 
medical study. Yet these prison officials, operating 
outside the public eye, are tasked with developing 
procedures by which inmates will be executed. Because 
legislatures have delegated responsibility for such 
protocols to unelected officials, it is imperative that 
courts not insulate a State’s protocol from challenge. 
Rather, the judiciary must provide a check on the 
exercise of such authority. In light of the recent trend 
toward constantly changing protocols, which has 
accelerated precipitously over the last decade, resulting 
in numerous botched executions, the courts have the 
constitutional responsibility to ensure such procedures 
comport with the Eighth Amendment. 
For a quarter century, States followed the three-
drug protocol this Court approved in Baze. But prison 
officials did not arrive at the three-drug protocol after 
independent analysis and evaluation. Rather, the 
protocol was “the product of administrative convenience 
and a stereotyped reaction to an issue, rather than a 
careful analysis of relevant considerations favoring or 
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disfavoring a conclusion.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). In fact, “[i]n the majority of 
States that use the three-drug protocol, the drugs were 
selected by unelected department of correction officials 
with no specialized medical knowledge and without the 
benefit of expert assistance or guidance.” Id. at 74–75. 
Following Baze, States “have changed their lethal 
injection protocols in inconsistent ways that bear little 
resemblance to the original protocol evaluated in Baze 
and even differ from one execution to the next within the 
same state.” Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1331. Rather than 
correct the unreasoned manner in which protocols had 
been adopted in the past, however, officials prioritize 
concern for administrative convenience over the need 
for a humane execution. Thus, as with the original three-
drug protocol, such changes are not the result of careful 
deliberation. For this reason, “their drug selections are 
not entitled to the kind of deference afforded legislative 
decisions.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
Ohio falls into this general pattern. Ohio has 
implemented several different lethal injection protocols 
since its adoption of lethal injection as an execution 
method. Initially, without independent analysis, Ohio 
mirrored Oklahoma’s original three-drug protocol that 
included sodium thiopental as the first drug. When 
sodium thiopental became unavailable, Ohio followed 
Oklahoma’s lead again by using pentobarbital, this time 
implementing its own variation by using pentobarbital 
in a one-drug protocol. Ohio prison officials then turned 
to a two-drug protocol of midazolam and hydromorphone 
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when pentobarbital became unavailable, resulting in the 
botched execution of Dennis McGuire in 2014. Following 
Florida’s lead this time, Ohio implemented the lethal 
injection protocol at issue in this case without 
independent evaluation. 
Under these circumstances, judicial review provides 
a necessary means by which to examine the 
constitutionality of the chosen lethal injection drugs, 
procedures, and administration. See, e.g., Morales v. 
Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding 
California’s protocol unconstitutional); Harbison v. 
Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 895, 903 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) 
(ruling State’s failure to adopt one-drug protocol 
recommended by state-commissioned study violated the 
Eighth Amendment), vacated, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 
2009); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 2:07-cv-04129, 2006 WL 
1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (concluding that 
Missouri’s lethal injection procedure presented 
unconstitutional risk due to maladministration); see also 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019) 
(rejecting the categorical approach to determining 
whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, 
and reaffirming the judicial role in comparing 
alternative methods). 
The plurality opinion in Baze did not seek to insulate 
lethal injection protocols from scrutiny. Baze, 553 U.S. 
at 62. The opinion specifically contemplated changes to 
the method “in light of new developments, to ensure 
humane capital punishment.” Id. As a result, in light of 
new evidence, each combination of drugs must be 
evaluated independently to determine whether it inflicts 
severe pain and needless suffering. 
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Such judicial oversight would not “substantially 
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing 
their execution procedures,” id. at 51, because 
legislatures do not concern themselves with the 
intricacies of lethal injection procedures. Thus, as 
Justice Stevens explained, “[t]he question whether a 
similar three-drug protocol may be used in other States 
remains open, and may well be answered differently in a 
future case on the basis of a more complete record.” Id.
at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The development of such records is critical. History 
demonstrates that the lethal injection protocols that 
prison officials created or modified embodied 
constitutionally unacceptable risks. Even when faced 
with evidence of botched executions involving the exact 
same combination of drugs, States have proceeded to use 
the protocol. Closer examination of such procedures was 
(and remains) hindered and, in some cases, foreclosed by 
the secretive nature in which prison officials develop and 
ultimately carry out their lethal injection protocols. 
Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 121–23; Eric Berger, 
Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due 
Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1388–95 (2014). The 
rigorous scientific examination required to prevent 
unnecessary pain and needless suffering will occur only 
if this Court reinforces the necessity of Eighth 
Amendment review of prison officials’ chosen lethal 
injection drugs and procedures. 
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II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
EFFECTIVELY FORECLOSES JUDICIAL 
SCRUTINY OF EXECUTION METHODS AND 
IS CONTRARY TO STATES’ HISTORICAL 
EXPERIMENTATION WITH EXECUTION 
METHODS. 
The Sixth Circuit’s finding that Petitioner failed to 
carry his burden under Glossip’s second prong—
identification of an available, feasible execution method 
that can be readily implemented—because Ohio may 
decline to be the first State to use a reliable and humane 
lethal injection protocol in the context of an execution 
effectively forecloses the judicial scrutiny that is critical 
to developing more humane execution methods and is 
contrary to States’ historical experimentation with 
execution methods. As established in Section I, supra, 
careful judicial review of States’ evolving execution 
methods is required to ensure compliance with the 
Eighth Amendment. If left standing, the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision not only would eliminate that crucial safeguard 
of an individual’s Eighth Amendment rights, but it is 
also in tension with the practical reality of how lethal 
injection methods are developed. States—including 
Ohio—have frequently and brazenly experimented with 
execution methods. This frequent experimentation 
belies any State’s claimed reticence to implement a 
protocol proposed by an inmate. To this end, States 
should not be permitted to categorically reject an 
inmate’s proposed alternative execution method merely 
on the basis that another State has not used the method 
in an execution. Ohio’s categorical rejection of 
Petitioner’s proposed alternative method—lethal 
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injection by secobarbital—is particularly problematic 
given that secobarbital is the most common drug used in 
physician-assisted suicides in the United States. 
If there has been one consistent theme in our 
country’s approach to executions, it is its 
experimentation. States have abandoned and adopted 
execution methods with alacrity. As soon as an older 
method no longer proved tenable, officials have adopted 
new protocols. This practice of experimentation 
necessitates robust judicial review of the new methods, 
to ensure that the new method does not inflict 
unnecessary pain and needless suffering, see supra 
Section I.C., but it is also necessary to facilitating the 
introduction of more humane methods of execution.  
Despite this history, the Sixth Circuit would halt this 
important search for more humane execution methods 
and foreclose the judicial scrutiny required to determine 
a State’s compliance with the Eighth Amendment. In 
rejecting Petitioner’s claim that secobarbital is a viable 
alternative to midazolam, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that Ohio’s desire “not to be the first [state] to 
experiment with a new method of execution” was a 
legitimate reason for Ohio to reject it as an alternative. 
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 946 F.3d 287, 
291 (2019). But the Court in Glossip summarily rejected 
the petitioner’s attempt to cast the country’s slow 
adoption of midazolam as evidence that the drug was 
unsuitable for executions. 576 U.S. at 891–92. According 
to the Court, “[t]hat argument, if accepted, would 
hamper the adoption of new and potentially more 
humane methods of execution and would prevent States 
from adapting to changes in the availability of suitable 
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drugs.” Id. By the same token, allowing States to reject 
a proposed alternative method merely because another 
State has not used it in an execution renders this Court’s 
two-prong test in Glossip a dead letter and forecloses 
the judicial review required to aid that search for more 
humane methods.
The Sixth Circuit’s logic contradicts historical 
practice. States, and Ohio in particular, have historically 
adopted new methods of execution that have not 
previously been used by another State.  As noted by 
Petitioner, Ohio has “been the State most willing to try 
new executions methods” when it became the first State 
(1) to adopt a one-drug protocol using sodium thiopental, 
(2) to use a one-drug protocol with pentobarbital, and (3) 
to use a two-drug protocol with midazolam and 
hydromorphone.  Pet’r’s Br. 21–22 n.6. States’ 
experimentation with new methods even dates back to 
the end of the 19th century. When New York replaced 
hanging with electrocution, no death row inmate had 
ever been executed by electric chair, and the electric 
chair had not even been invented. Banner, supra, at 181; 
Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 71–74. Likewise, no other 
State employed lethal gas as an execution method when 
Nevada made its switch out of a desire to take a more 
humane approach. Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 83. Within 
thirty-five years, another ten States would follow 
Nevada’s lead. Id. And Oklahoma employed both a novel 
method and novel drug cocktail in replacing 
electrocution with lethal injection, in an effort described 
by the initiative’s sponsor “to make the execution less 
violent and a little more quiet.” Denno, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. at 66–71; Tim Barker, Author of Lethal Injection 
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Bill Recalls His Motive, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 7, 1990), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/author-of-lethal-in
jection-bill-recalls-his-motive/article_90c3f8c3-22c5-
5cd7-8d0c-42fb17378968.html. This spirit of 
experimentation has continued to this day in the 
numerous States that have rejected the national trend 
toward midazolam and instead adopted protocols that 
their peers have yet to test. See supra pp. 16–17.   
Ohio’s categorical rejection of secobarbital is 
particularly irrational given that the drug is frequently 
used in physician-assisted suicides. Jennie Dear, The 
Doctors Who Invented a New Way to Help People Die, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2019/01/medical-aid-in-dying-medica
tions/580591/ (“For years, the two barbiturates widely 
considered the best drugs for hastening death in 
terminally ill patients were pentobarbital and 
secobarbital.”). Ohio’s claimed reticence to use 
secobarbital because no other State has used it in an 
execution rings hollow where Ohio has frequently 
experimented with drugs that have a far thinner track 
record than secobarbital. The mere fact that the drug 
has not been used in an execution should hardly be 
sufficient on its own to foreclose Petitioner’s challenge.  
To prevent this incoherent result, States should not 
be permitted to categorically reject alternative methods 
of execution on the basis that the method has not 
previously been used in an execution. Holding otherwise 
would foreclose judicial scrutiny of execution methods 
and cut short the critical search for more humane 
execution methods.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant the petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
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